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The proposed California Civil Rights Initiative' seeks to elimi-
nate affirmative action by government entities in California except
where required by federal law. A vast array of state and local pro-
grams intended to remedy discrimination against women and minori-
ties would be eliminated. Moreover, future innovative programs
designed to overcome continuing discrimination would never be
implemented.
The CCRI would eliminate all state and local programs that
"grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of pub-
lic employment, public education, or public contracting."2 This would
eliminate outreach programs targeting women and minorities, goals
and timetables, and countless other efforts to overcome past race and
gender discrimination.
Additionally, the CCRI actually would tolerate more discrimina-
tion against women than is permitted under current law. Subdivision
(c) of the proposed initiative declares: "Nothing in this section shall
* Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I am
very grateful for the excellent research assistance of Brian Mulhairn and Melanie Petross
and the superb memoranda prepared by Jill Ratner and Patty Bellasalma.
1. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GErNERAL ELECn7ON, Nov. 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996) [hereinafter CCRI].
2. Id.
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be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex
which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting."' Current law al-
lows bona fide occupational qualifications based on gender in only a
limited number of employment circumstances. For example, no cur-
rent law, state or federal, allows gender to be used as a qualification
for public education or public contracting. Yet the CCRI would per-
mit gender-based qualifications in this context, thereby expressly per-
mitting discrimination against women in areas never before allowed.
In fact, the CCRI could mean a major change in California con-
stitutional law that would substantially lessen the protection against
gender discrimination. Currently, under the California Constitution,
gender is treated as a suspect classification. That is, gender discrimi-
nation is allowed only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling gov-
ernment purpose.4 The CCRI would amend the California
Constitution to allow gender discrimination in employment, educa-
tion, and public contracting whenever "reasonably necessary" to
achieve a bona fide qualification. 5 This shift to a rational basis stan-
dard of review would be a dramatic change in the law and would evis-
cerate the California constitutional protection against sex-based
discrimination.6 These effects are discussed in detail below.
This Article focuses solely on assessing the likely impact of the
CCRI on women and minorities in the state. Therefore, several im-
portant topics are not considered. For example, this Article does not
discuss the constitutionality of the CCRI and whether it could with-
stand challenge in the courts. Nor does this Article assess the eco-
nomic costs if state and local governments eliminate affirmative
action. Perhaps most important, voluntary affirmative action in the
private sector is also not considered in this Article. Since the CCRI
applies only to the government and government agencies, it would not
preclude private employers from engaging in voluntary affirmative ac-
tion. Thus, possible ramifications of the CCRI in discouraging pri-
vate affirmative action efforts are beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, it must be emphasized that this is only a preliminary assess-
ment as there remains a continuing need to obtain additional informa-
tion about state and local affirmative action programs and their
effects.
3. Id
4. See infra note 17.
5. CCRI, supra note 1.
6. See infra, notes 66, 73 and accompanying text.
IMPACr OF THE CCRI
Statistics about the impact of affirmative action programs are dif-
ficult to find. The most extensive data involves the impact of affirma-
tive action in the University of California system. Because of the
recent decision by the Regents to eliminate affirmative action in the
University of California, the CCRI will have minimal immediate im-
pact in that realm.7 Accordingly, this Article does not examine the
CCRI's impact on the University of California in detail. However,
because the CCRI is a constitutional amendment, and therefore very
difficult to change, it would be much harder to modify or overturn the
Regents' decision to eliminate affirmative action in the future.
Additionally, the effects of the CCRI will be greatly increased if
pending federal legislation, which would eliminate affirmative action
at the federal level, is adopted.8 However, neither of these bills has
been reported out of committee. If the federal laws are changed, the
CCRI will have a substantially greater impact. Thus, the fundamental
question arises as to whether the CCRI is a desirable change in Cali-
fornia law without reference to federal law. Examination of the inter-
play between the CCRI and federal legislation aimed at eliminating
affirmative action presents further challenges beyond the scope of this
Article. For example, an interesting question arises regarding what to
do if the federal law is not changed and there are conflicting standards
in programs that require the use of both federal and state funds.
This Article addresses the impact of the CCRI in three parts.
Part I briefly describes the context of the affirmative action debate.
Two points are essential in discussing affirmative action. First, dis-
crimination against women and minorities remains an extremely seri-
ous problem in California as well as the entire country. Second,
affirmative action efforts are already limited by Supreme Court deci-
sions. Under these rulings, the government can engage in affirmative
action only where it is necessary to achieve a "compelling purpose."9
Under the CCRI, affirmative action programs would be eliminated
even when they meet this strict standard and serve a vital objective.
Only those programs required by federal law would survive the CCRI.
Part H, which is the main part of this Article, describes the impact
of the CCRI in eliminating programs that benefit women and minori-
ties. Part II specifically considers the effects of the CCRI in eliminat-
ing affirmative action in employment, education, and contracting.
7. See Susan Yoachum et al., UC Scraps Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRON., July 21,
1995, at Al.
8. See H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1085, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
9. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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Finally, Part III of this Article briefly explains how the CCRI
would allow more gender discrimination than is permitted under cur-
rent law as the CCRI expressly allows gender to be used as a basis for
discrimination in contracting, education, and employment. Part III
also explains that one of the most important effects of the CCRI could
be to lessen dramatically the protection against gender discrimination
under the California Constitution.
I. The Context for the Debate Over the CCRI
In order to accurately assess the impact of the CCRI, it is essen-
tial to recognize the ongoing problem of discrimination against wo-
men and minorities as well as the extent to which government
affirmative action is already limited by current law. By any measure,
enormous inequities based on race and gender remain in the
workforce. Studies consistently show that whites and blacks, with
identical educational backgrounds and employment histories, are
treated differently in hiring and employment. Whites are more likely
to get hired, more likely to receive higher salaries once hired, and less
likely to be fired.10 A controlled study found that white testers re-
ceived job interviews at a rate 22% higher than equally situated Afri-
can-American testers; white testers received job offers at a rate 415%
higher than African-American testers; white testers received higher
wage offers 17% of the time; and white testers were 48% more likely
to be informed of additional opportunities than African-American
testers.'
These gender and race inequities permeate the employment pro-
cess. For example, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich found that 97%
of the senior managers of the Fortune 1000 industrial companies and
the Fortune 500 companies are white, and 95% to 97% are male.'2
Specifically, the racial breakdown is: 97% white, 0.6% African-Amer-
ican, 0.3% Asian, and 0.4% Latino.13 In Fortune 2000 industrial and
service companies, 5% of senior managers are women, and of that
10. See, e.g., Marc Bendick, Jr., Research Evidence on Racial/Ethnic Discrimination for
Affirmative Action in Employment, in DISCRIMINATION AND AFIRMATIVE ACTION A-61,
A-65 (Assembly Judiciary Comm., Cal. State Legis. 1995).
11. Id See also Mark Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination
Through Controlled Experiments, 23 REv. BLACK POL. ECON. 25 (1994); for reports of
other similar studies, see also GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS & CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 21 (July 19, 1995).
12. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE LEGIS., DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRM-
ATivE ACION A-21 (1995) (testimony of Maria Contreas-Sweet and Beverly A. King).
13. Id
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5%, virtually all are white. 4 The disparities present in wage distribu-
tion also reflect gender and race inequities. African-American men
with professional degrees earn only 79% of the amount their white
male counterparts earn; African-American women with professional
degrees earn only 60% of what white males earn with similar creden-
tials. 15 A recent study by Andrew Brimmer, former Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce, found that the annual loss to the United States'
economy from discrimination against African-Americans alone is ap-
proximately $240 billion.' 6
Countless studies have been conducted which show that discrimi-
nation against women and minorities continues. Further, a large body
of data has accumulated revealing the impact of such discrimination.
Thus, any discussion of affirmative action must begin by recognizing
that discrimination and its effects continue to be a serious problem.
Additionally, it also must be recognized that under current law
the ability of the government to engage in affirmative action programs
is limited. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the government
may use race as a factor to help minorities only if the program meets
strict scrutiny and is "narrowly tailored." That is, the government
must prove that the affirmative action plan is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose. 17 Expressed another way, the test
for racial classifications under the federal Constitution is the same,
whether the discrimination is against minorities or against whites, as
strict scrutiny must be met if the government is using race as a basis
for decision-making.
Examples of the Supreme Court's implementation of strict scru-
tiny are evidenced in two recent cases. In 1989, in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,' 8 the Court invalidated a city's plan to set aside pub-
lic works monies for minority-owned businesses, and held generally
that all state and local use of racial classifications to benefit minorities
must meet strict scrutiny.'9 In 1995, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,2° the Court extended the Croson holding to include the federal
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Larry Bivins, Discrimination Said to Cost More than Affirmative Action, THE DE-
TROrr NEWS, April 18, 1995, available in LEXIS Nexis Library.
17. Gender discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny and thus it must be sub-
stantially related to an important government purpose. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
18. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
19. 1d at 509-11.
20. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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government and held that all racial classifications, regardless of the
level of government imposing them, must meet strict scrutiny.21
California therefore is already substantially limited in its ability to
engage in any conduct, including affirmative action, that discriminates
based on race or gender. Race discrimination, for example, is allowed
only if the state or local government can prove that it is necessary to
achieve a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. Implementation of the CCRI would eliminate
even the affirmative action efforts that meet this extremely rigorous
test.
H. The Impact of Eliminating Preferences
Under the CCRI, even if a government action does not discrimi-
nate, if it in any way advantages or helps based on race or gender, it
will be unlawful. According to subdivision (a) of the CCRI: "The
state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public educa-
tion, or public contracting. 22 It is extremely important to note that
the provision distinguished "discrimination" from "preferential treat-
ment." In other words, even a non-discriminatory government action
would be outlawed by the CCRI if it advantages or helps based on
race or gender. The CCRI, however, does not define "discriminate"
or "preferential treatment."
Thus, there is no way to know exactly how courts will construe
these phrases. It is likely, however, that government officials and
agencies will define these terms broadly so as to avoid the prospect of
litigation. In other words, if the CCRI is adopted, there is every rea-
son to believe that state and local officials and agencies will refrain
from any actions that might be regarded as discrimination or prefer-
ences so as to avoid being sued. At the very least, the CCRI clearly
would forbid any difference in treatment of people on the basis of race
or gender.23 Likewise, the CCRI would prevent any programs that
attempt to help minorities or women where similar programs do not
exist for whites and men.
A vast array of state and local affirmative action programs would
also be eliminated. However, before reviewing specific programs, it is
21. Id. at 2097.
22. CCRI, supra note 1.
23. The only exception is where gender would be a bona fide qualification under sub-
division (c), CCRI, supra note 1; see also infra part III.
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important to note that "preferences" can take many forms. For exam-
ple, preferences exist in the form of outreach programs to encourage
women and minorities to apply for jobs, contracts, or educational op-
portunities. Even if the ultimate decision-making process is color-
blind, it is still a "preference" under the CCRI because more effort is
made to encourage women and minorities to apply than men or
whites.
Preferences also take the form of aggressive recruiting and pro-
motion of higher education of women and minorities. Again, even if
the decision-making will be race and gender neutral, affirmative ac-
tion can be an active step toward finding qualified women and minori-
ties and encouraging them to apply for particular positions. Further,
preferences exist in programs that target specific needs among women
and minorities. For example, programs which encourage women to
pursue advanced education in math and science would be eliminated
by the CCRI as a gender-based preference. Similarly, many programs
that exist to prepare minorities for higher education likewise would be
eliminated.
Another form of preferences are goals for hiring, contracting, and
admitting women and minorities to colleges and universities. The
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of these types of goals.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,2 4 Justice O'Connor stated
that "[a]lthough the constitutionality of the hiring goal as such is not
before us, it is impossible to evaluate the necessity of the layoff provi-
sion as a remedy for the apparent prior employment discrimination
absent reference to that goal."5 Goals and timetables have been key
aspects of affirmative action efforts utilized by the Federal Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and by state law.26 The CCRI
would eliminate such goals, except where required by federal law, be-
cause they set targets for hiring women and minorities and thus are a
form of preference, even if no discrimination exists.
Additionally, preferences also occur when race or gender is used
as one factor among many in hiring decisions. For example, as a law
school faculty member, I have seen our Appointments Committee
pursue many objectives simultaneously such as the following: encour-
aging faculty to teach particular subjects, recruiting individuals with
prestigious academic credentials, and seeking racial and gender diver-
sity. There are many factors considered and race undoubtedly is one
24. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
25. Id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. See infra part II.A.
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of them. Similarly, under civil service hiring practices, race or gender
may be used in selecting among qualified applicants." All of this
would be eliminated by the CCRI.
Finally, at the extreme, preferences can take the form of set-
asides or even quotas. This form of affirmative action is very limited
by current law and almost always occurs only if it is ordered by a court
as necessary to remedy proven past discrimination.'
Therefore, assessing the impact of the CCRI requires recognizing
that it will not simply eliminate set-asides and quotas, which are al-
ready quite rare, but a vast array of programs that attempt to remedy
a long history of race and gender discrimination. The following sec-
tions consider specific programs concerning public employment, pub-
lic education, and public contracting that would be eliminated by the
CCRI.
A. Public Employment
California has a long history of using affirmative action in hiring
for state and local government positions. On February 1, 1974, then-
Governor Ronald Reagan formalized California's affirmative action
program.29 Responsibility for evaluating affirmative action programs
was delegated to the State Personnel Board.30 The applicable code,
California Government Code section 19790, states: "Each agency and
department is responsible for establishing an effective affirmative ac-
tion program. Each agency and department shall establish goals and
timetables designed to overcome any identified under-utilization of
minorities and women in their respective organizations."3 However,
these goals and timetables do not create quotas or set-asides. For ex-
ample, for state civil service jobs, all applicants must score in the top
three rankings on state civil service exams. No extra points are given
for race or gender (although extra points are given to veterans). Re-
gardless, gender, race, and ethnicity may be considered by employers
in selecting individuals from the lists of those who have satisfactory
test scores.32
The goals and timetables for hiring for state jobs have been suc-
cessful in many areas. There is no doubt that affirmative action pro-
27. See infra part II.A.
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF REsEARcH, TIm STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
CALIFORNIA 25 (1995).
30. Id
31. Cal. Gov't Code § 19790 (West 1995).
32. Id at 26.
grams have accounted for an increase in the employment of women
and minorities, especially in more senior positions. A recent study
found that:
[Tihe composition of the public work force at the higher salary
levels went from being more than 90 percent white in 1975 to
less than 70 percent in 1993. The percentage of Asian-Ameri-
cans, African-Americans, and Hispanics at those levels went
from 3 percent or less per group in 1975-the year after Gover-
nor Reagan made California's affirmative action program offi-
cial-to 9.9 percent, 9.3 percent, and 11.7 percent respectively.13
Since 1978, when the State Personnel Board first reported the results
of the state's affirmative action plans, "representation of ethnic minor-
ities increased from 22.7 percent to 41.8 percent[,] a gain of more than
19 percent of all full time employees., 3 4 Women in state government
increased from 41.8% to 46.5 % over this time period. Thus, goals
and timetables have created an incentive for hiring and promoting
qualified women and minorities in California. Yet, there are many
areas where the goals and timetables have not been met. A study by
the California State Personnel Board examined nineteen categories of
state jobs. As of June 30, 1992, it found that parity-representation
proportionate to representation in the labor market-had been
achieved by women in eight of nineteen categories; by African-Ameri-
cans in sixteen of nineteen categories; by Hispanics in seven of
nineteen categories; and by Asians in eleven of nineteen categories.3 6
The CCRI would eliminate goals and timetables for hiring wo-
men and minorities. It is a "preference" to have a goal for hiring wo-
men, but not men, or to have a goal for hiring minorities, but not
whites. It is a "preference" to encourage employers to select qualified
women and minorities when they are among the applicants. Accord-
ingly, under the CCRI, additional progress towards employment par-
ity would be impeded, and some of the gains would be lost. Studies
on behavior by employers, discussed earlier, 7 indicate that without
the encouragement provided by goals, fewer minorities and women
will be hired and promoted. Many studies around the country docu-
ment that goals and targets are very successful in increasing employ-
33. It at 35.
34. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE LEGIS., supra note 12, at A-119 (testi-
mony of Laura M. Aguilera).
35. Id.
36. CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, supra note 29, at 26.
37. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
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ment of women and minorities.38 Professor Barbara Bergmann,
Distinguished Professor in the Department of Economics at American
University, attempted to assess the impact of the CCRI on state em-
ployment. Her conclusion is sobering:
The loss of affirmative action programs for state and local gov-
ernment employees would result in a deterioration in the labor
market position of the African-American and Hispanic commu-
nities, and on the labor market position of women generally.
The labor market still harbors considerable discrimination
against these groups. In part because of the affirmative action
programs of public employers, and because of the relative inhos-
pitability [sic] of private employers toward them, members of
these groups depend for their earned income disproportionately
on public employers .... The loss of affirmative action programs
in the public sector could be expected to increase the unemploy-
ment rate of African-Americans by more than one percentage
point. Unemployment rates for Hispanics and women of all races
would also rise."9
Additionally, outreach programs in local governments exist to in-
crease employment of minorities and women. For example, the Public
Works Department, the Fire Department, and the County Sheriff in
Los Angeles target female recruits by posting job openings in places
frequented by women, such as all-female health clubs. The Public
Works Department notifies as many as 800 community agencies of
employment opportunities, including the following: 109 that serve the
Hispanic community, 56 that represent the African-American commu-
nity, 50 that serve the American-Indian community, and 30 that repre-
sent the interests of Asians and Filipinos. 40 As part of this outreach
effort, the Los Angeles County Public Works Department has imple-
mented a special internship program for minority and female civil en-
gineering students which sponsors tours for minority engineering
students allowing them to spend a day at work with a county engi-
neer.4" The CCRI would abolish these programs because they are re-
cruitment efforts directed at women and minorities; they are a form of
"preference" and thus would be eliminated if the CCRI becomes law.
38. See, e.g., Jonathan Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment, 2 J.
of Labor Econ. 439 (1984); Jonathan Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action Regula-
tion and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. of Econ. Persp. 47 (1990).
39. Barbara Bergmann, The Costs of Abolishing Affirmative Action to the State and
Local Governments of California, 3 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the au-
thor) (emphasis added).
40. See OFFICE OF APFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPLIANCE, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 1995, Attachment Affirmative Action Program Good
Faith Efforts (1995).
41. Id.
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Finally, with regard to employment, it should be noted that the
CCRI will have a profound effect on employment discrimination liti-
gation. The CCRI creates a vehicle for any white male denied em-
ployment to file a lawsuit and allege that an impermissible
"preference" was given to a woman or minority hired in his place. As
mentioned above, "preference" is not defined in the statute and its
ambiguity is an incentive to sue. Unlike other employment discrimi-
nation laws that have administrative remedies and detailed proce-
dures,42 the CCRI is an open invitation for disgruntled individuals to
file suit and allege impermissible preference. Consequently, assessing
what additional costs government will have to bear due to these suits,
as well as how much fear over litigation could result in a decrease in
the hiring of women and minorities, is an arduous task.
B. Public Education
Affirmative action has made an enormous difference in public ed-
ucation in California. A study of the potential effect of eliminating
affirmative action at the University of California found that the per-
centage of Latino students would drop from 18% to 5-7%, and the
percentage of African-American students would fall from 7% to
%. Although the Regents of the University of California already
have eliminated affirmative action, the CCRI would have a devastat-
ing effect on other programs that exist on state and local levels
throughout California. The most important are the many outreach
programs designed to benefit women and minorities which would be
lost under the CCRI as a form of preference.
For example, many studies have documented the under-
representation of women in math and science courses at upper-grade
levels. 4 As a result, outreach programs have been created to en-
courage enrollment. For example, the ACCESS Center and Network
of California State University, Los Angeles has created two residen-
tial summer math and science intensive programs for middle and high
school minority girls in the Long Beach, Los Angeles, and Pasadena
school districts. The ACCESS Center, together with California State
42. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1996);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996), as amended by Act of
Feb. 15, 1980,31 U.S.C. § 52, Act of Nov. 21, 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981, Act of Jan. 23, 1995,2
U.S.C. § 1311(d); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 14, 29 U.S.C. § 633
(1996), as amended by Act of Jan. 23, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 201(c)(2), 109 Stat. 8.
43. Cynthia Lee, Scholars Debate Value of Affirmative Action, U.C. Focus 8, June/July
1995.
44. Am. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, 26-27 (1992).
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University, Los Angeles, has created a "Girls Science Network" for
girls in grades six through twelve. The program includes field trips,
mentor pairings, and fellowships. Studies of such programs have doc-
umented their effectiveness in encouraging girls to enroll in math and
science courses and even to pursue these fields in later studies and
employment.45
Similarly, there are many outreach programs that attempt to re-
cruit and help minority students. The California Postsecondary Edu-
cation Committee, for example, created an Early Academic Outreach
Program for seventh through twelfth graders. The program provided
"academic support, individual and group advising, informational
materials, summer residential experiences, and assistance with admis-
sions and financial aid applications. 46 Ninety percent of the students
participating were racial minorities. The benefits were dramatic:
In 1994, 46.3 percent of Black program participants and 51.3
percent of Latino program students were eligible to attend the
University of California as contrasted with 7.5 percent and 6.8
percent of these same groups statewide who were fully eligible
in 1990.... Of the graduating seniors who participated in these
programs, 72.7 percent enrolled the following fall in California
colleges and universities as contrasted to only 61.1 percent of
students statewide and 50.6 percent of Black, Latino, and Native
American students in the State.4 7
Many other such programs exist. The MESA program-Mathematics,
Engineering, and Science Achievement-is primarily funded by the
state and seeks to increase the number of minority students with the
academic background necessary to pursue a college education in a
math or science oriented field of study.48 The Immediate Outreach
program seeks "[t]o recruit to the University academically qualified
underrepresented freshmen and transfer students. 49 The Systemwide
Affirmative Action Support Services program seeks to enhance the
academic performance of minority students through academic advis-
ing, tutoring, workshops, and summer bridge programs.5 0  The
Pregraduate Mentorship Program attempts to provide academic en-
45. CHRISTINE MATrHEWS ROSE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, UNDER-
REPRESENTED MINoRITIES AND WOMEN IN SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND ENGINEERING:
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES FOR THE 1990's (1990).
46. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE LEGIS., supra note 12, at A-143 (testi-
mony of Warren H. Fox).
47. IL at A-144.
48. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE LEGIS., supra note 12, at F-19.
49. Id. at F-103.
50. Id.
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richment programs and mentoring to help prepare minority students
for graduate programs.51
These are just a few examples of the many programs that are
designed for outreach to racial minorities and women who have been
traditionally underrepresented in colleges and universities. All such
programs would be eliminated as a preference by the CCRI because
they are benefits generally not available to white male students. In-
deed, a wide array of educational programs that benefit women and
minorities at the college and university level would be eliminated by
the CCRI. For example, many colleges and universities have "wo-
men's resource centers." Typically, these centers provide workshops
on various topics such as self-defense, rape prevention, sexual harass-
ment, and other aspects of campus life. These centers provide essen-
tial services. One-fourth of college women have been victims of rape
or attempted rape52 and according to the Association of American
College's Project on the Status and Education of Women, approxi-
mately thirty percent of all female college students experience some
form of sexual harassment.53 Yet, the CCRI would abolish these cen-
ters as a preference for women because no comparable programs exist
for men.
Additionally, local governments also have outreach programs for
women and minorities. For example, the Los Angeles County Public
Works Department has a "Partners in Math and Science Program" to
mentor minority elementary and secondary students who excel in
math and science. The Department also participates in school events
to inform female students about jobs which have not traditionally
been available to women. The Legislative Analyst's Report to the At-
torney General concerning the meaning and fiscal impact of the CCRI
concluded that the CCRI would have a devastating effect on such out-
reach and enrichment programs:
The measure would eliminate affirmative action programs used
to promote the hiring and advancement of women and minori-
ties for state and local government jobs, to the extent these pro-
grams involve "preferential treatment." In addition, the
measure would eliminate a variety of public school (kindergar-
ten through grade 12) and community college programs such as
counseling, tutoring, school financial aid, and financial aid to se-
51. Id. at F-104.
52. Nadine Brozan, Gang Rape: A Rising Campus Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,1986,
at B8; see also Ten Facts About Violence Against Women: Hearings on S. 101-939 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary on Women and Violence, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
53. Ann Hardie, Sexual Harassment Widespread on College Campuses in U.S., THE
ATLANTA CONSTUnTON, Mar. 28, 1991, at A9.
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lected school districts, where these programs are targeted based
on race, sex, ethnicity, or national origin. . . . The measure
would eliminate a variety of programs such as outreach, coun-
seling, tutoring, and financial aid used by the University of Cali-
fornia and California State University to admit and assist
students from "underrepresented" groups.54
C. Public Contracting
The Public Contract Code sets a goal for contracts awarded by
any state agency, department, officer, or other state government en-
tity.55 The target is as follows: fifteen percent of the contracts should
be given to minority business enterprises, and not less than five per-
cent should be given to business enterprises owned by women. The
targets are obviously modest; they are goals, not quotas or set-asides.
Other statutes set the same goals for public contracts awarded for
state correctional facilities and programs.56
Discrimination in contracting has long been a serious problem.
For example, the Supreme Court expressly recognized a long history
of discrimination in public contracting in Fullilove v. Klutznick.5' In
that case, the Court upheld a federal law that set-aside ten percent of
federal public works monies to local governments for minority-owned
businesses.5 8 Another example is in Los Angeles County, where in
1994, ninety-five cents of every dollar went to white-owned construc-
tion firms; "Latino contractors received about 4 cents for every dollar
spent on county public works construction projects [and] African-
American contractors [received] less than a penny on the dollar."5 9
"Women-owned construction companies received about 6 cents of
every county subcontracting dollar spent. '6° Nationally, although wo-
men own thirty-seven percent of all businesses in the United States,
they receive only about two percent of all federal contracts. 6'
Goals and targets have been effective in increasing contracts with
businesses owned by minorities and women, although in many areas
the goals have not been met. For example, prior to the implementa-
54. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, California Legislative Analyst, and Russell S.
Gould, Director of Finance, to Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General (Sept. 12, 1995) (on
file with author).
55. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE. § 10115 (West Supp. 1996).
56. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10470 (West Supp. 1996).
57. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
58. Id at 492.
59. CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, supra note 29, at 45.
60. Ld. at 46.
61. Gary Belsky & Susan Berger, Women Could Be Big Loser if Affirmative Action
Fails, MONEY, Aug. 1995, at 21.
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tion of goals and timetables, in fiscal year 1989-90, about 0.52% of the
California Department of General Services' contracts were with mi-
nority-owned businesses. After the implementation of goals and time-
tables there was a dramatic change. In fiscal year 1992-93, 10.1% of
contracts were given to minority businesses.62 This, of course, is still
less than the original goal of fifteen percent and much less than the
proportion of minorities in the population. Comparatively, in fiscal
year 1992-93, 5.8% of the Department of General Services contracts
were given to women-owned businesses.63
Further examples of the effect of these goals is evidenced in con-
tracting with the California Department of Corrections and the Cali-
fornia Department of Water Resources. Contracts with the
Department of Corrections went from 1.1% given to minority busi-
nesses in 1990 to 6.7% in 1994. Contracts with women-owned busi-
nesses went from 0.4% in 1990 to 6.2% in 1994. 4 Similar statistics
exist for the California Department of Water Resources contracts
where in 1990, 6% of contracts were given to minority-owned busi-
nesses and 1% were with women-owned businesses. In 1994, after the
implementation of the goals and timetables, the numbers had risen to
10.9% with minority-owned businesses and 6.1% with women-owned
businesses.
These statistics reveal that the goals and targets set to cure dis-
crimination in public contracting are not quotas. Indeed, the fifteen
percent target for minority-owned business has not been met in any
area. However, statistics show that goals and targets have made an
enormous difference. These benefits and future advances would be
lost if the CCRI is adopted.
IM. Allowing Discrimination Against Women
In addition to eliminating the many necessary and desirable pro-
grams described above, the CCRI would actually tolerate more dis-
crimination against women than is permitted under current law.
Subdivision (c) of the proposed initiative states: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications based
on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
62. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLA-
TURE ON MINORITY, WOMEN AND DISABLED VETERAN BuSINESS ENTERPRISE PARTICIPA-
TION IN DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICE CONTRACTS 2 (1993).
63. Id. at 1.
64. CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CAL. STATE LIB., Overview on Affirmative Action in
DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION H-25 (Assembly Judiciary Comm., Cal. State
Legis. 1995).
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public employment, public education, or public contracting. '65 Under
current law bona fide qualifications based on gender are allowed only
in the area of employment. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
permits gender discrimination in employment only if there is a bona
fide occupational qualification. The Supreme Court has declared that
this is an "extremely narrow" exception to the general prohibition
against gender discrimination in employment.66 However, there is no
assurance that California courts will interpret the "bona fide qualifica-
tion" language in the CCRI as narrowly as the current standard. It is
particularly troubling that the California Attorney General's summary
of the initiative states that the provision "does not prohibit reasonably
necessary.., qualifications based on sex ... ."67 This is much broader
than current law because it would not require proof of a bona fide
qualification as the justification for gender discrimination. Indeed, the
fact that the Attorney General describes the provision in terms much
different than current law could be used by courts in the future to
depart from the narrow and settled meaning of "bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications."
Very significantly, subdivision (c) does not use the same language
as the current exception that exists for employment discrimination.
The law now allows gender discrimination in employment only where
it is reasonably necessary for a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. ' 68 Subdivision (c) of the CCRI leaves out the word occupa-
tional. This is significant because the United States Supreme Court
has stressed the word "occupational" in explaining why this is a nar-
row exception to the CCRI. For example, in International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. ,69 the Court emphasized that the word
"occupational" means that discrimination is allowed only in "instances
in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's abil-
ity to perform the job. 70 In Johnson Controls, the Court said that the
employer could not exclude potentially fertile women from working in
a battery factory because women were equally capable of performing
the occupation of making batteries.71 Omitting the word "occupa-
65. CCRI, supra note 1.
66. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
67. Daniel E. Lungren, Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General,
in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECrION, Nov. 5,1996 (forthcoming Sept.
1996).
68. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334.
69. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 206.
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tional" thus broadens the scope of subdivision (c) as compared to cur-
rent law.
Moreover, no current law, state or federal, allows gender to be
used as a bona fide qualification for public education or public con-
tracting. Yet, the CCRI would do this and thus expressly permit dis-
crimination against women in areas where it never has been permitted
by law. The practical effect is difficult to assess as claims of a bona
fide reason for discriminating against women in contracting or educa-
tion are non-existent. Subdivision (c), however, would serve to open
the door to gender discrimination by expressly permitting it.
First, and most important, subdivision (c) would lessen the stan-
dard of review for claims of gender discrimination brought against the
government.72 Currently, under the California Constitution, gender is
treated as a suspect classification, meaning that a program must sur-
vive strict scrutiny if it uses gender-based criteria.73 The use of strict
scrutiny means there is a strong presumption against gender discrimi-
nation and it will be allowed only if the government can prove that it
is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Subdivision
(c), however, states that gender can be used as the basis for discrimi-
nation if it is "reasonably necessary" to do so in education, employ-
ment, or contracting. This language is characteristic of rational basis
review and would allow significantly more discrimination against wo-
men. Rational basis review is enormously deferential to the govern-
ment and rarely invalidates government actions.74
As an amendment to the California Constitution, the CCRI
would change the standard of review in gender discrimination cases
and substantially lessen constitutional protection against sex-based
discrimination in education, contracting, and employment. Because of
72. Gender discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny at the federal level and
strict scrutiny under current California law. See supra note 17; infra note 73.
73. See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16-17, (1971) (stating that gender is a suspect
classification and strict scrutiny should be used).
74. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961) ("[A] statutory discrimi-
nation will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.");
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (stating that stat-
utory classifications will be invalidated "only if based on reasons totally unrelated" to legit-
imate governmental ends); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466
(1981) (stating that a statute will survive so long as a legislature "could rationally have
decided" that the statute would fulfill its purpose); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)
(The Court observed that "courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a
legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and
ends."); F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating that "a
statutory classification.., must be upheld ... if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.").
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the radical difference between strict scrutiny and rational basis review,
the CCRI would eviscerate the California Constitution's current pro-
tection against gender discrimination.
Supporters of the CCRI argue that the effect of subdivision (c) is
narrowed by its initial words, "Nothing in this section,""7 and that
subdivision (c) would not modify other provision in the California
Constitution. This argument, however, ignores that the CCRI is an
amendment to the California Constitution. Currently, the California
Constitution assures equal protection in Article I, section 7, which
states: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."'76
Also, Article I, section 8 declares: "A person may not be disqualified
from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employ-
ment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.' 7
The CCRI would amend these provisions. Thus, in the areas of public
contracting, education, and employment, the CCRI would replace the
existing California constitutional provisions with regard to race and
gender discrimination. That, of course, is the purpose of the CCRI
and, in addition, it is well established that more recent and more spe-
cific constitutional and statutory provisions control over earlier ones.78
This is not a repeal by implication, but rather, an explicit change
in the California Constitution. The California Supreme Court has ex-
plained that "[i]n order for the second law to repeal or supersede the
first, the former must constitute a revision of the entire subject, so that
the court may say that it was intended to be a substitute for the
first."' 79 The CCRI is an express amendment of the California Consti-
tution. If it is adopted, any court dealing with an issue of discrimina-
tion or preference in the area of contracting, education, or
employment will be required to apply its provisions and not the prior
California Constitution which it modifies. Thus, any court dealing
with any issue of gender discrimination in contracting, education, or
employment under the California Constitution will be required to ap-
ply subdivision (c).
Additionally, the CCRI will open the door to further discrimina-
tion against women by educational institutions and in contracting that
would not be allowed under current law. Schools could attempt to
75. CCRI, supra note 1.
76. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
77. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
78. See Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,510-11 (1991) (stating that the Califor-
nia Constitution may be changed by a measure that on its face alters or reforms its terms).
79. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855,868 (1980).
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argue that particular programs are justified in excluding women based
upon some "bona fide" difference between men and women. Govern-
ment agencies could make similar efforts in issuing contracts. In es-
sence, the concern is that section (c) permits discrimination in areas
where the law does not currently allow it.
For example, the CCRI could well permit increasing disparities in
funding for athletic programs for men's and women's sports. Enor-
mous gender disparities continue to exist in sports funding at the high
school and college levels. Despite efforts under federal Title IX to
reach equilibrium, men receive seventy percent of college athletic
scholarship money, and men's sports receive eighty-three percent of
college athletic recruiting money.80 Current law, at both the state and
federal levels, is committed to ending this disparity by disallowing ex-
ceptions that permit disparity even if it serves a bona fide purpose.
California law is crucial, both for schools that are not covered by Title
IX because they do not receive federal funds, and for all schools as an
additional enforcement mechanism. Additionally, if efforts now pend-
ing in Congress are successful in weakening Title IX, there will be no
mechanism to advance equality in sports funding except at the state
level. If the CCRI is adopted, it is quite possible that California's ef-
forts at equalization will be eliminated. Schools will utilize the lan-
guage of the CCRI and argue that the disparities in athletic funding
are a "bona fide" basis for gender discrimination under section (c) of
the initiative. Thus, although it is impossible to know how courts ulti-
mately will rule, there is an enormous risk that adoption of the CCRI
would place funding for girls' and women's sports in danger.
Supporters of the CCRI argue that subdivision (c) is necessary to
protect privacy, such as by preventing men working as locker room
attendants in female locker rooms. However, subdivision (c) is not
phrased as a limited provision dealing only with privacy, but rather,
has broad language applicable to all government actions. Also, no
specific exception is necessary to safeguard privacy. The current Cali-
fornia Constitution prohibits gender discrimination but has no provi-
sion like subdivision (c) and, of course, no court has interpreted the
Constitution in a manner that creates a threat to privacy. If nothing
else, the express protection of privacy in the California Constitution,
which is unmodified by the CCRI, would provide adequate safeguards
even if subdivision (c) was not included.
80. FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, EMPOWERING WOMEN IN SPORTS 1 (1995).
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IV. Conclusion
This Article is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the
impact of the CCRI. Rather, it is an initial attempt to assess the con-
sequences if the initiative is adopted. Although the data is incom-
plete, especially as to city and county affirmative action efforts, the
conclusion is clear: the CCRI would have a devastating effect on pro-
grams designed to remedy discrimination against women and minori-
ties. The gains of past years would be erased, and additional progress
would be unlikely. Thus, two central conclusions emerge:
1. A wide array of programs would be eliminated. These include
efforts to target women and minorities for recruitment, outreach pro-
grams, and goals and timetables. The result would be a substantial
increase in unemployment among Blacks, women, and other minori-
ties. It would mean that fewer minority students would attend col-
leges and universities and more would drop-out once there. Fewer
girls would be likely to take math and science programs, and essential
programs for women on campuses would be abolished. Finally, it
would mean that long-standing discrimination in government con-
tracting against businesses owned by women and minorities would
continue and probably increase.
2. Subdivision (c) of the CCRI would significantly lessen current
protections against gender discrimination. Subdivision (c) would per-
mit discrimination in education, employment, or contracting if it is
reasonably necessary to a bona fide qualification. As an amendment
to the California Constitution, this would change the standard of re-
view from strict scrutiny for gender discrimination to the rational basis
test. Simply put, it is the difference between the courts allowing gen-
der discrimination only in rare and compelling circumstances and the
courts allowing gender discrimination in virtually any situation.
Moreover, subdivision (c) would expressly permit gender discrimina-
tion in areas where the law has never allowed it. Entirely apart from
the remainder of the initiative, subdivision (c) would have a profound
effect on the law in virtually eliminating protection against gender dis-
crimination under the California Constitution.
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